FROM THE BOOKSHELF
■ PETER T. ITTIG, Feature Editor, College of Management, University of Massachusetts, Boston

DECISIONS MADE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS ARE AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF DECISION SCIENCES. Some business schools offer courses on this subject. In the following guest article, Jeffrey Keisler
reviews a significant new book in the field and reports on an interview with the author.
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ver the past 50+ years, Howard
Raiffa has laid foundations for
game theory (Games and Decisions,
Luce & Raiffa, 1957), decision theory (Introduction to Statistical Decision Theory, Pratt,
Raiffa & Schlaifer, finally published in 1995,
30+ years after it was written), decision
analysis (Decision Analysis, Raiffa, 1968),
multi-attribute decision analysis (Decisions
with Multiple Objectives, Keeney & Raiffa,
1976), and negotiation analysis (The Art and
Science of Negotiation, Raiffa, 1982). Behind
the scenes, he was establishing centers for
research in these areas, consulting on matters of national importance, and advancing research in related fields. During the
late 1980s and 1990s, he enriched these areas with new books on decision theory,
negotiation and decision making (Smart
Choices, 1999).
I completed my Ph.D. under Prof. Raiffa
in 1992, and eagerly awaited the new book,
Negotiation Analysis. I was not disappointed—this deep work will be another
landmark in the decision sciences. It is a sequel of sorts to Raiffa’s 1982 book. That book
had far less theory, and covered more simple
negotiations with more prose. Now, Raiffa
combines in one consistent map almost all
of the areas and directions he has explored
during his career. The result is a single theoretical approach that starts from the problem of a single decision maker with a simple
decision and works toward the general problem of multiple participants in complex relationships making complex decisions. Much
of the material in this book is adapted from
previous published material. The adaptations are major, however, and with additional new material and explanations of the
connections between the different parts of
the book, this is an entirely new and coherent experience.

Prof. Raiffa graciously agreed to an
interview in conjunction with this book
review, and his comments explain the motivation, some of the theoretical context,
and the intended impact of the book. The
remainder of the review is meant to provide more specific information about the
material covered, and to explain its relevance to readers of Decision Line.

Negotiation
Analysis: The Art
and Science of
Collaborative
Decision Making
by Howard Raiffa,
with John
Richardson and
David Metcalfe
Belknap Press, 2003,
576 pages, $49.95.
www.hup.harvard.edu/
contents/
RAINEG_toc.html.

THE FIRST FIVE CHAPTERS OF THE BOOK PROVIDE
necessary background material on decision
analysis, behavioral decision theory, game
theory, and negotiations, and for some
readers, this will be mostly (but not entirely) review. The next 22 chapters develop
through four sections increasingly complex
problems in interactive decision making:
win-lose negotiations, win-win negotiations, intervention in negotiations, and decision making with many parties; the latter
draws creatively on related areas including auctions, voting, and principal-agent
theory. The ideas are developed with intertwined cases (including a lot of first-hand
observation and comment on Panama Canal, Camp David, as well as business deal-
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ings), experimental results, discussion, and
mathematics. The book appears at first
glance to have a lot of mathematics
throughout. It does and the book is not a
quick read, but the mathematics are at a
basic level and should really be accessible
to any reader of Decision Line.
There are no new proofs, but many
important new, elegant, and worthwhile
concepts, each of which could give birth to
many potential research problems (as did
Raiffa’s earlier books). These ideas are laid
out and illustrated with rich examples, but
not developed as theory, leaving a wideopen frontier for researchers.

Key ideas
Raiffa’s overall taxonomy of decision making approaches: Individual decision making
can be analyzed descriptively, prescriptively,
or normatively. Plural decision making
(where decisions of one party affect other
parties) may involve parties acting separately (the realm of game theory) or jointly.
If jointly, the situation may be asymmetric
prescriptive-descriptive (figuring out what
your side should do, but predicting what
your partner will do—one version of negotiation analysis), symmetrically descriptive
(predicting outcomes of negotiations), or
symmetrically normative (cooperative
game theory).
One area where this leads to interesting analysis is individual decisions about
how to interact with other decision makers—when to negotiate, accept an offer,
seek mediation, etc. The integration of game
theory into more practical negotiation situations is welcome. Advice on how to work
in real situations—largely on balancing
claiming and creating value. A motif in the
book is that the more the other side lies,
the more it pays to be honest.
Different types of negotiators: There are
cooperators, claimers, adversaries—and
ways to negotiate against each (from a
practical and an analytical perspective).
Different types of negotiations: FOTE
(full open truthful exchange)/POTE (partial open truthful exchange) are two approaches that negotiators may agree to
abide by. Also considered are standalone
vs. interconnected negotiations, repetitive
and parallel negotiations, etc. Good prenegotiation preparation is to know what

Decision Line, March 2003

type of situation it is. Again we get practical and analytical guidance on how to prepare and manage the different types of
negotiations.
Different types of sets of negotiators:
There are many parties, pluralistic parties,
advisors and experts, principals and agents,
and coalitions.
Different types of interventions: There
are several types of arbitration, as well as
mediation, and neutral joint analysis (NJA),
explicit consideration of intervenor as a
party in the negotiations (from a descriptive, prescriptive or normative view), and
development of role and analytics for NJA.
Analytic techniques: Beyond the synthesis of previous theory, Raiffa introduces
several new tools. Negotiation templates
serve as a tool for preparation. These templates can incorporate multi-attribute utility theory or similar scoring approaches,
and structure choices to be made in the
negotiation as well as using something like
decision tables. They can be used with
multiple parties.
A big revelation is the use of spreadsheet optimization to identify desirable
deals as solutions. This approach permeates much of the book, and its concreteness makes it likely to have significant
impact on practice.
POP analysis (percent of potential)
considers fairness of outcomes from different viewpoints. A related analytical and
theoretical discussion of fairness includes a
thought-provoking section on how a rich
man and a poor man should split a sum of
money.

An Interview with the Author,
Howard Raif fa (Frank Plumpton
Ramsey Professor Emeritus of
Managerial Economics at the
Harvard Business School and the
Kennedy School of Government)
Q: Why did you write this book? What
has changed since your other books?
A: I spend a lot of time interacting with the
negotiation community, and coming from
a different background than most of the
others, I think differently about a whole
host of topics than they. For example, there
may be a general seminar discussion about

some interesting topic arising in a multipleparty negotiation. My background in mathematics leads me to think in the following
ways: “Hmmm, that’s interesting. Would
that same phenomenon show up also in a
two-player negotiation? What would be the
counterpart in a formal two-player game?
Is the essence of the problem one of individual decision making—either descriptive,
normative, or prescriptive?” For some
problems it may be hard to tell which world
we are in: is it decision analysis, behavioral
decision theory, game theory, or negotiation? It is important to integrate these four
strands or fields. The walls between them
should be porous. We should have a way

I’m hoping that decision
sciences, broadly interpreted
to include the design of
organizations, should be
in the catalog of most
universities in 20 years.
of thinking that transcends all these seemingly separate strands of thought. It is this
realization that has motivated me to write
this book.
Q: How did the book take shape?
A: It was time for a second edition of The
Art and Science of Negotiation, but if I was
going to do it, I wanted to integrate the
companion subjects of decision analysis, behavioral decision theory, and game theory.
The enterprise grew rapidly and threatened
to become too voluminous, over 700 pages,
so, very reluctantly, I began to eliminate
some special topics. I was unhappy. Then I
came on the idea of putting the extra (eliminated) material, mostly already written but
not fully polished, on a Web site and, with
that mind set, these adjustments became
easier to swallow. Granted, this book is focused primarily on negotiations, but included are the basics of individual decision
making—under certainty and uncertainty
and game theory.
The original title for the book had been
“Collaborative Decision Making.” But the
editor preferred “Negotiation Analysis,”
so we changed the title. I’m a little sorry
we did. I have a pet project (which this book
supports) which is to have decision sciences
join economics, psychology, as a bona fide
department in universities. Not just a Ph.D.
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program, but to bolster it at the undergraduate level, with electives and a research
center. It would be “loverly” if Harvard
University could introduce such an integrated program for other universities to
follow. Places like Carnegie Mellon and
Duke have a jump start on us. I’m hoping
that decision sciences, broadly interpreted
to include the design of organizations,
should be in the catalog of most universities in 20 years. Currently, where there are
programs on decision making, the prescriptive view is often missing—there are specialists only interested in the descriptive
psychology of decisions without a prescriptive bone in their bodies. This exclusive diet
is wrong. There is a need for synthesis.
Q: Besides the integration of descriptive
and prescriptive decision and game
theory, what else is new, distinctive, and
memorable—what are you especially
proud of?
A: Three innovations:
• The emphasis on negotiations in which
each party tells the whole truth to the others. It was surprising to me how often this
polar extreme prevails in the real world
— especially in cases of deal-making rather
than dispute-resolving. I then systematically back down from this extreme: the
protagonists tell each other the truth, but
not the whole truth —they truthfully disclose their preference evaluations but do
not disclose their reservation values; and
so on down the ladder to the cases where
the parties delight in dissembling like good
poker players.
• The importance of jointly designing a template for negotiations where the parties
decide just what has to be decided and
options for joint choice.
• The book examines in great detail the roles
of intervenors—the facilitator, mediator,
and arbitrator—and introduces a new
character into the mix, dubbed by me as a
neutral joint analyst, an NJA if you will.
The NJA can be an individual or a team
somewhat like the intervening team from
the U.S. led by President Carter at Camp
David in the Egyptian/Israeli dispute. The
NJA works with all the parties and leads
the negotiators to an efficient and equitable outcome. Confidentiality and fairness—both actual and perceived—is
imperative for the NJA. In some cases of
long-festering, intractable disputes, the
NJA must shuttle back and forth among
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the disputants interrogating each in turn.
This type of NJA is acting as a decision
analyst whose objectives are to help all
his clients. This of course, involves making horrendous tradeoffs across people
but the aim of the NJA is to be non-evaluative, which is not the case of standard
arbitration.
The NJA can be an invitee of the disputing
parties or an inviter or initiator getting
reluctant parties to start a negotiation.
Providing NJA services might entail a
team of intervenors and could be a function of a research center that provides a
permanent table for analyzing and resolving the world’s most intractable problems.
Q: How do you see this book in relation to
potential future research in the Decision
Sciences?
A: I don’t think of this as a stimulus to researchers. There are researchable topics,
however, and I would push analytical doctoral students in that direction. These topics include techniques for developing,
evaluating, and analyzing negotiation templates in various cases. Where utility attributes aren’t independent, things are
more complex. Evaluation then is related
to combinatorial bidding. I am pleased that
a lot of the abstract problems that arise are
mathematical programming problems and
these come up naturally. If a neutral joint
analyst receives template evaluations, then
the neutral joint analyst has to analyze the
problem and the nature of the problem is
mathematical programming.
Q: What would readers of this book learn
that would help them improve as negotiators?
A: One, the importance of preparation.
Two, that there is a lot to gain from a
collaborative atmosphere with honesty
prevailing.
Three, the deleterious effects of premature claiming of value. When someone
makes a demand, I recommend the reply,
“That’s interesting. Let’s put it down as a
possible solution, but let’s not take the time
now to examine that suggestion as part of
an equitable compromise . . . . After all, we
have suggestions of our own for consideration when the time is appropriate. If you
claim, then I will be forced to claim, and we
shall spiral downwards.”

Four, that the potential for joint gains
is higher when value structures differ! Difference help generate joint gains.
Q: What is to be learned from the quantitative approach in this book, as opposed
to Fisher and Ury’s (Getting to Yes) type
books?
A: Fisher and Ury have done a great service with their book. Their book is not competitive with this one, and I would be happy
if this was read along with Fisher and Ury
and similar books on negotiation, as well
as Bazerman’s on behavioral decision
theory.
Suppose in a heated dispute, you are
the intervenor. There are two aspects you
have to deal with. On the one hand, the
people problems and the emotional issues,
and on the other hand, the analytical problems of the decision maker. You have to
deal with the people problems first before
getting to analytical details. My book will
help prepare negotiators and intervenors
deal with the analytical side of the ledger
but be sensitive to the softer aspects as well.
Q: Do you have any thoughts about how
to incorporate this book in a class?
A: I am working on an undergraduate
course, of one or two semesters, for students who are comfortable with elementary math. The course is called Decisions,
Games and Negotiations (DGN). I am currently teaching a version of this course with
a mathematics professor, Daniel Goroff, as
part of the quantitative reasoning requirement at Harvard. I have created about 35
PowerPoint presentations for this course,
which will eventually be available in some
form—maybe a Web site, maybe on a CDROM. The slides need a voice accompaniment, much like the audio-graphics
materials I created in the 1980’s.
Q: Is there any advice one can give to the
analytically inclined negotiator dealing
with a non-analytic type?
A: Yes, preparation, understanding desirability of outcomes, and conscious tradeoffs.
But be careful not to intimidate the other
party with analytics—they will be self-conscious because you are doing something
they aren’t. I may have a template but may
not disclose it, which violates the ideal of
full, open, truthful exchange. In this respect,
I may dissemble. If I have an idea I may
wait until you say something close to it,
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and then endorse it. This is an art, as well as
a science.
Q: So, what do you think of calling this
your unified field theory, and what kind
of practitioner do you envision?
A: I like the notion of a unified theory but it
may be too grandiose. I would like some
practitioners trained in each of the four
fields and comfortable going from one to
another. Discourse in the field of negotiation should be broad. For example, the literature is so concerned about people
problems that there is not much about joining analysis with psychology. Negotiation
training is a growth industry, but not
among mathematically inclined economists; more in social psychology, psychology, government departments, etc. The
book is designed to attract more analytical
people from economics, OR, engineering,
etc.—there’s a place for them in the Decision Sciences world.
Q: What will it take for them to be well
received by the negotiation community?
A: Time . . . and success. The logic is clear
enough. It’s a battle that has to be won. A
large group of undergraduates trained in
it will put pressure on the field.

***
Who should read this book?
Decision Sciences researchers should
find this of great interest (much more than

Raiffa indicated)—it is full of potential research problems in decision sciences and a
framework for analyzing them. Raiffa is
proposing to make decision making more
of a science, and lays out the framework
for doing so. Researchers in decision analysis, negotiation analysis, or game theory
will gain a deeper understanding of the
theory they already know. Even researchers in other areas of the decision sciences
may discover new applications for their
own work, for example, in math programming—the rather simple problems Raiffa
lays out constitute an area in which researchers can quickly reach the state of the
art.
Others who will benefit include
businesspeople and MBA students who either specialize in negotiation, or have a high
comfort level with mathematics. This book
will make them better negotiators, and will
contain ideas that are not found anywhere
else, that is, in other books on negotiation.
It will be challenging, though, to apply all
of the concepts. It would take multiple readings over the course of a career.
Also, this book could be the basis for a
great introductory graduate course in decision sciences / operations research, one
that gives much more understanding of the
richness with which the tools may be applied. It could be used for a core course in
economics (replacing introductory game
theory). It could be used in an MBA elective

course for mathematically inclined students. It could be used in an advanced undergraduate course in decision sciences,
possibly as a capstone. The supplementary
material (spreadsheets, essays, Powerpoint
slides) that will be on the Web site for this
book should help a lot. Most instructors
would want to include in-class exercises, of
which there are many already in circulation (including in Raiffa’s 1982 book).
In sum, synthesizing interactive decision sciences as a unified field was an ambitious idea and this book pretty much pulled
it off. The book is important and useful,
and decision scientists ought to read it. ■
Peter T. Ittig, Feature Editor
College of Management
University of Massachusetts
Boston, MA 02125-3393
voice-mail: 617-287-7886
peter.ittig@umb.edu
http://www.faculty.umb.edu/peter_ittig/

Alpha Iota Delta Update
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ith spring here and all of the renewal we see around us, let me
take a few minutes to talk about
a new project that we’ve been working on.
With the able help of our webmaster,
Sameer
Verma,
our
Web
site
(www.alphaiotadelta.org) has been up and
running for well over a year now. By the
time you read this, we will have the framework for a new membership directory in
place.
The membership directory will serve
many purposes for the Alpha Iota Delta
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community. First, it will provide members
with the ability to network with colleagues
scattered all over the world. Second, it will
allow us to maintain current contact information for our members. And lastly, it will
provide the foundation for other initiatives
that we are planning, including an electronic
newsletter.
In order for this new membership directory to reach its ultimate goals, it will
require all of us to take a few minutes to fill
out the information form on the Web site.
Encourage all of the AID members you

know to participate. We will publish privacy information on the site, and will respect your wishes as to what information
is publicly displayed.
We are excited about the opportunities that this will provide for us moving
forward and hope that you will be as well.
Contact information is available on the Web
site and we welcome any feedback and
suggestions that you may have. We look
forward to hearing from you. ■
http://www.alphaiotadelta.org
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